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A Tribute to Justice Roger 0. DeBruler
JUSTICE FRANK SULLIVAN, JR.*
On August 8, 1996, Justice Roger 0. DeBruler retired at age sixty-two after
nearly twenty-eight years on the Indiana Supreme Court. His tenure was the
second longest in the court's history and he had it within his power to break Isaac
Blackford's record of thirty-five years simply by serving until he reached age
sixty-nine and a half. But being a record-holder was just not as important to this
modest man as being able to pursue the wide range of interests that he had been
forced to neglect in the face of the relentless press of court business.
I hope that someone writes the story of Justice DeBruler's life because it is a
story worth telling. And if that story is told properly, it will tell not only of his
contributions to the law but also of his love and devotion to his wife, Karen, and
their children and of his legendary friendship with Professor Ken Stroud; it will
describe his growing up in an Evansville where, one suspects, "the inhabitants
.. always valued neighborliness, hospitality, and concern for others, even those
who may be strangers;"' it will discuss his military service and his mastery of the
German language; and it will explore his years at Indiana University where, one
suspects, he engaged in "open debate and principled dissent to the conventional
wisdom of the day."2
If the story of Justice DeBruler's life is written properly, it will tell not only
of his supreme court service but also of his law practice in the office of legends
John J. Dillon and L. Keith Bulen and their partners-for of that, I am sure, there
is much to tell. And it will tell of his appointment to the Steuben Circuit Court
at age twenty-eight by Governor Welsh; of his election to that position in 1964;
of his noteworthy service on that bench; of his personal role in reviving the
Lockerbie neighborhood in downtown Indianapolis; and of commitment to proper
diet and exercise. And of so much more.
This essay cannot attempt those things. Nor can it provide a comprehensive
survey of even his supreme court years. It will merely present four vignettes from
the tenure of Justice DeBruler-in the form of four of his opinions.
I
Theon Jackson was charged with two robberies totaling nine dollars. Jackson,
a twenty-seven year-old deaf and partially blind man, had never been to school
and had only a rudimentary understanding of sign language. He could neither
read nor write. At a competency hearing, three experts agreed that Jackson could
not comprehend the nature of the charges against him nor assist in his defense
because he had a mental deficiency and also because he had almost no means of
communication other than a few gestures and pantomimes.
* Justice, Indiana Supreme Court.
1. Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 541 (Ind. 1994) (DeBruler, J.).
2. Grody v. State, 257 Ind. 651, 658, 278 N.E.2d 280, 284 (1972) (DeBruler, J.) (striking
down statute on First Amendment grounds).
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The trial court ordered Jackson committed to the state mental health
department pursuant to a statute which provided that if the court found that the
defendant did not have the "comprehension sufficient to understand the
proceedings and make his defense," 3 the court was to order the defendant
"confined" in an appropriate state psychiatric institution. Under the statute, when
a defendant's sanity was restored, the commitment ended and the defendant was
tried for the offense "the same as if no delay or postponement had occurred by
reason of defendant's insanity."
But in Jackson's case, the psychiatrists agreed that there was almost no chance
that he ever could improve his understanding sufficiently to be tried. Jackson
appealed, arguing that under his circumstances the commitment amounted to a
life sentence.
On February 19, 1970, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected Jackson's
argument, holding that his confinement was within the state's "police power [to]
provide for the safety, health, and general welfare" which "necessarily includes
the confinement, care and treatment of the mentally defective, retarded or
insane."4 While the majority rejected Jackson's argument, Justice DeBruler
found it compelling. Pointing out that the commitment statute contemplated a
delay in or postponement of the trial "to alleviate the defendant's mental
condition so that he can be tried," Justice DeBruler argued in dissent that the
statute had to be construed to provide that the commitment be a temporary one.'
"When the defendant's condition is permanent, as in this case, and he cannot be
helped by any known psychiatric technique, then the defendant cannot be
committed under this statute because the purpose of the commitment cannot be
accomplished," Justice DeBruler wrote. "[T]he existence of unproved criminal
charges operates to keep appellant confined in a state institution for life,"6 he
concluded. "This is a blatant violation of the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution."7
The United States Supreme Court had the last word. The high Court reversed
and followed Justice DeBruler's dissenting position.' Writing for a unanimous
Court, Justice Blackmun echoed Justice DeBruler's dissent: "At the least, due
process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed."9
II
Eddie Tho~ias was a Jehovah's Witness whose hobby was Bible reading. His
religious beliefs prohibited him from producing or aiding in the manufacture of
items used in the advancement of war. After working for a period of time in a
factory's foundry, he was transferred to an assembly line which manufactured
3. Jackson v. State, 253 Ind. 487, 493, 255 N.E.2d 515, 516 (1970).
4. Id. at 492, 255 N.E.2d at 518.
5. Id. at 493, 255 N.E.2d at 518 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 494, 255 N.E.2d at 519 (DeBruler, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
7. Id.
8. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738-39 (1972).
9.Id. at 738.
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army tanks. Thomas diligently sought without success a transfer to another
department. He requested a layoff, which was denied, and then quit due to his
religious convictions. Thomas sought unemployment benefits but was denied on
grounds that he had voluntarily terminated his employment.
The court of appeals reversed the unemployment compensation board's
decision"0 but on July 18, 1979, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated the decision
of the court of appeals and affirmed the board's denial of benefits to Thomas.
The court reasoned that because Thomas was "not required by statute to violate
a cardinal tenet of his religion," he was not entitled to unemployment
compensation simply because he voluntarily quit work for religious reasons.
In dissent, Justice DeBruler invoked the United States Supreme Court case of
Sherbert v. Vernert2 in which Adell Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, had been
discharged for refusing a change in her work week which would have required
her to work on the Sabbath. Justice DeBruler pointed out that the high Court had
held that Sherbert's disqualification for unemployment benefits violated her
rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. "I find no
reason," he wrote, "to conclude that Thomas should not be accorded the same
constitutional protection for the free exercise of his religious belief."' 3
Thomas appealed to the United States Supreme Court which held in his favor.
Like Justice DeBruler, Chief Justice Burger invoked the Sherbert precedent:
"Here, as in Sherbert, the employee was put to a choice between fidelity to
religious belief or cessation of work; the coercive impact on Thomas is
indistinguishable from Sherbert."'4
III
In 1976, in response to health care provider fears of a medical malpractice
crisis, the legislature adopted the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act.'" The new
act subjected negligence claims against health care providers to special controls
limiting patients' remedies. In Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital,6 the Indiana
Supreme Court considered four challenges to the constitutionality of these
provisions.
Justice DeBruler wrote the opinion for a unanimous court. He began by setting
forth the conditions in the health dare and insurance industries that gave rise to
the Act and then set forth the court's standard of review in considering
challenges to the constitutionality of statutes: that the Act be accorded every
presumption supporting its validity; that the burden was on the parties
10. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 178 Ind. App. 156, 381 N.E.2d 888
(1978).
11. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 271 Ind. 233, 244, 391 N.E.2d 1127,
1133 (1979).
12. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
13. Thomas, 271 Ind. at 249, 391 N.E.2d at 1136 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
14. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717 (1981).
15. IND. CODEANN. §§ 16-9.5-1-1 to 16-9.5-10-5 (Bums 1993) (repealed and replaced by
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-12-1-1 to 27-12-18-2 (Bums 1994)).
16. 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
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challenging the Act to show its unconstitutionality; and that a statute is not
unconstitutional "simply because the court might consider it born of unwise,
undesirable, or ineffectual policies."' 7
Justice DeBruler's opinion then began a lengthy and detailed examination of
each constitutional challenge. The opinion has been discussed elsewhere"8 and
it is beyond the scope of this essay to do so in any detail here. In brief, the
constitutionality of the statute was affirmed in all respects because, in Justice
DeBruler's view:
In dealing with the constitutionality of a statute of our State, we do not sit to
judge the wisdom or rightness of its underlying policies. When a state
legislature enacts a statute such as this which is related to the public health
and welfare, such statute in order to be consistent with due process "need not
be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It
is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct
it.
19
IV
On Justice DeBruler's last day in office, he handed down his final majority
opinion in the case of Schiro v. State,20 the most extensively litigated death
penalty case in Indiana Supreme Court history-and the death penalty case on
which the court had been most closely divided. On three previous occasions,
Thomas N. Schiro's case had been before the court and, although his death
sentence had been affirmed each time, never were there more than three justices
in the majority. And, with changing membership on the court, three different
justices had, at different times in the past, voted to vacate the death sentence."
The case is also the only modem Indiana death penalty case on which the United
States Supreme Court has written.2"
What closely divided the justices who had reviewed Schiro's case were not the
facts. His crime made all who studied it recoil in horror. But several important
aspects of the case raised concern, the most important of which was that the jury
had unanimously recommended that Schiro not be put to death for his crime. In
17. Id. at 381-82, 404 N.E.2d at 591.
18. See, e.g., Daniel J. Harrington, Torts, 15 IND. L. REv. 425, 425-29 (1982); Marilyn
Nickell, A Remedy for Indiana's Product Liability Malady, 21 VAL. L. REV. 159, 174-78
(1986).
19. Johnson, 273 Ind. at 387, 404 N.E.2d at 594 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); cf Steup v. Indiana Housing Finance Auth., 402
N.E.2d 1215 (1980)).
20. 669 N.E.2d 1357 (Ind. 1996).
21. Schiro v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind.) (DeBruler and Dickson, JJ., voting to
vacate sentence), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 910 (1989); Schiro v. State, 479 N.E.2d 556, 562 (Ind.
1985) (DeBruler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1036 (1986); Schiro v. State, 451
N.E.2d 1047 (Ind.) (DeBruler and Prentice, JJ., voting to vacate sentence), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1003 (1983).
22. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 (1994).
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three earlier dissents, Justice DeBruler had argued that the jury's
recommendation should be followed.23
This time, Justice DeBruler's analysis prevailed. He pointed out that after
Schiro's most recent appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, the court had adopted
"a form of closer appellate scrutiny for cases ... wherein the jury recommends
against death" and that Schiro specifically requested such scrutiny in his original
appeal. Although "the jury fully appreciated the details of Schiro's crime," it
"unanimously recommended that the death penalty not be imposed." Justice
DeBruler wrote: "When the unanimous rejection by the jury of the predicate for
imposition of the death penalty, with all such rejection imports, is placed in
tandem with the evidence in mitigation, with all such evidence imports," he
continued, "we conclude that it may not be said that the facts available in the
record support the conclusion that the death penalty is appropriate." Thomas
Schiro's death sentence was modified to a term of years.24
CONCLUSION
These four opinions-but a sliver of Justice DeBruler's work-give a feel, I
think, for his humanity, his devotion to constitutional rights, his respect for the
role of the people's elected representatives, and his strict and persistent scrutiny
of the appropriateness of the sanction in death penalty cases. His retirement is
a great loss for the Indiana Supreme Court, the law, and the people of our state.
But, as the foregoing opinions illustrate, though Justice DeBruler himself has left
the court, his extraordinary legacy remains.
23. Schiro v. State, 533 N.E.2d at 1208 (DeBruler, J., dissenting); Schiro v. State, 479
N.E.2d at 562 (DeBruler, J., dissenting); Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d at 1064 (DeBruler, J.,
dissenting).
24. Schiro, 669 N.E.2d at 1358-59.
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